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On Eavesdropper-Tolerance Capability of Two-Hop
Wireless Networks
Yuanyu Zhang, Yulong Shen, Hua Wang and Xiaohong Jiang, Senior Memeber, IEEE
Abstract—Two-hop wireless network serves as the basic net-
work model for the study of general wireless networks, while
cooperative jamming is a promising scheme to achieve the physi-
cal layer security. This paper establishes a theoretical framework
for the study of eavesdropper-tolerance capability (i.e., the exact
maximum number of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated) in
a two-hop wireless network, where the cooperative jamming is
adopted to ensure security defined by secrecy outage probability
(SOP) and opportunistic relaying is adopted to guarantee relia-
bility defined by transmission outage probability (TOP). For the
concerned network, closed form modeling for both SOP and TOP
is first conducted based on the Central Limit Theorem. With the
help of SOP and TOP models and also the Stochastic Ordering
Theory, the model for eavesdropper-tolerance capability analysis
is then developed. Finally, extensive simulation and numerical
results are provided to illustrate the efficiency of our theoretical
framework as well as the eavesdropper-tolerance capability of
the concerned network from adopting cooperative jamming and
opportunistic relaying.
Index Terms—Security, networking, reliability, eavesdropper-
tolerance.
I. INTRODUCTION
TWO-HOP wireless networks, in which a source cancommunicate with its destination directly or via a inter-
mediate relay, have been a class of basic and attractive network
scenarios [1]. More importantly, the performance analysis in
such two-hop networks lays the groundwork for the study in
general multi-hop wireless networks. Due to the broadcast
nature of wireless channels and the increasing demand for
exchanging confidential information, ensuring secure and re-
liable transmission in such wireless networks has become a
challenging yet critical task in practice, especially for those
applications demanding high security and reliability, such as
battle command, emergency treatment and disaster relief.
Traditionally, information is secured above the physical
layer by applying cryptography [2] or other approaches [3].
The idea of cryptography is to encrypt the information through
a cryptographic algorithm (e.g., RSA and AES) that is hard
to break in practice by any eavesdropper with limited com-
puting power and without the secret key. These schemes are
therefore termed computationally secure [4], since they are
built around the unproven computational hardness assumption.
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However, recent advances in computing power (e.g., quantum
computing) could make it possible to break such difficult
cryptographic algorithms [5] and thus the demand for ever-
lasting security in modern wireless communications becomes
more and more urgent. That is why there is an increasing
interest recently in physical layer security, behind which the
fundamental idea is to exploit the inherent physical charac-
teristics of communication channels to provide information-
theoretic security to the legitimate transmissions without the
assistance of a secret key [6], [7]. It is more important that no
limitations are assumed for the eavesdroppers in terms of the
computing power or network parameter knowledge. Moreover,
the physical layer security approaches can offer some signif-
icant advantages over the traditional cryptographic scheme,
like no need to employ complicated cryptographic algorithms
and guaranteeing an everlasting security without applying key
distribution and management, which is extremely expensive
and difficult for large scale decentralized networks. Addition-
ally, physical layer techniques can be used with cryptographic
approaches in a complementary way and thus can augment the
security achieved by cryptography. Therefore, physical layer
approaches have been very promising in guaranteeing a strong
form of security in wireless communications.
In the seminal work [8] on the physical layer security,
Wyner introduced the wire-tap channel model where the
source transmits messages to the intended receiver over a
discrete memoryless main channel which is wire-tapped by
an eavesdropper (wiretapper) through another discrete mem-
oryless channel, called wiretap channel. This work was later
generalized to the broadcast model in [9] and to the Gaussian
setting in [10]. These works indicated that perfect secrecy can
be achieved if the intended receiver has a better channel than
the eavesdropper, which however can hardly be satisfied in
practice. Thus, many works sought to explore the possibility
of secure transmission when the eavesdropper observes a better
channel. Maurer [11] showed that perfect secrecy is achievable
when the eavesdropper enjoys a better channel by generating a
secret key over a public and error-free feedback channel. Nev-
ertheless, this work is treated as a further step in the direction
of public-key cryptology. Hero [12] introduced the spacetime
coding over multiple antennas for secure communication and
artificial noise injection strategy was first proposed by Negi
and Goel [13], [14], where the noise generated by the extra
antennas of the transmitter such that only the eavesdropper
channel is degraded. However, due to the cost of deploying
multiple antennas and designing efficient noise, these schemes
are not suitable for large scale wireless network with nodes
of single antenna. Barros and Rodrigues et al. [15] analyzed
2the secrecy outage probability and outage secrecy capacity
of a quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel and showed that
fading alone can guarantee the information-theoretic security
even when the eavesdropper has a better average SNR than
the legitimate receiver. Tekin and Yener [16] introduced the
cooperative jamming scheme where a nontransmitting user
can increase the secrecy capacity by transmitting jamming
signal instead of its codewords to confuse the eavesdropper.
Since random noise can be generated by helper nodes rather
than extra antennas, cooperating jamming has been widely
introduced to enhance the physical layer security in wireless
networks [17]–[27].
By now, various works have been dedicated to explore the
security performances in wireless networks with cooperative
jamming. For instance, the per-node secure throughput in large
decentralized networks was explored in [17], [18], [28], the
secrecy capacity maximization problem was investigated in
[19]–[21] based on cooperative communication, how to design
efficient jamming strategies in terms of power or position of
jamming was analyzed in [22]–[24], the opportunistic selection
and use of the relays to enhance the physical layer security was
studied in [25]–[27]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
relatively fewer works consider the performance limits of the
eavesdropper-tolerance capability of a network. As shown in
[29], [30], the density of the eavesdroppers has a dramatic
impact on the connectivity of secrecy graph and the secrecy
throughput, which implies that the number of eavesdroppers
present in the network is critical in guaranteeing the network
security. Knowing the relationship between the eavesdropper-
tolerance capability and other network parameters not only
plays an important role in the security performance analysis of
the network but also serve as the guideline on determining the
system parameters to build a secure network for the designers.
Therefore, we focus on the eavesdropper-tolerance capability
study of a two-hop wireless network in this paper.
The related works regarding eavesdropper-tolerance ca-
pability can be classified into two categories according to
the network size. For infinite network scenarios, the scaling
law of eavesdropper-tolerance capability against the per-node
throughput was studied in [28] by constructing a highway sys-
tem. By cooperative jamming, Goeckel et al. [31] considered
one source-destination pair with opportunistic relaying scheme
[32], where the best relay is selected among the available
relays based on some policy in terms of their channels to the
source and destination, and analyzed the asymptotic behavior
of eavesdropper-tolerance capability as the number of relays
goes to infinity. However, the metrics used in their paper
cannot fully reflect the security and reliability of the end-
to-end transmission. This work was later generalized to a
scenario with multiple source-destination pairs where artificial
noises are generated from concurrent transmitters [33]. For
finite network scenarios, Shen et al. [34] proposed a flexible
relay selection scheme and derived the lower bound on the
eavesdropper-tolerance capability. However, it is notable that
all the above works have focused on either the order-sense
scaling law results for infinite networks, or bounds for finite
networks. Such order sense results or bounds are certainly
important but cannot reflect the actual eavesdropper-tolerance
capability in more practical network scenarios with finite
nodes, which is more important for the system designers.
In our previous work [35], we considered a random relay
selection scheme and derived the exact eavesdropper-tolerance
capability, which can exactly tell us how many eavesdroppers
a network can tolerate at most for a desired level of security
and reliability. However, the results showed that with the ran-
dom relay selection, the eavesdropper-tolerance performance
is not good, especially for small-scale networks and high
security/reliability requirement.
In this paper, we establish a theoretical framework to
explore the eavesdropper-tolerance capability in a two-hop
wireless network, where the cooperative jamming is adopted
to ensure security defined by secrecy outage probability (SOP)
and opportunistic relaying is adopted to guarantee reliability
defined by transmission outage probability (TOP). Different
from [31], we use different outage probability metrics that
can fully characterize the security and reliability of the end-to-
end transmission. More importantly, we consider the inherent
channel dependence of the transmissions in two hops, which
is critical in determining the exact eavesdropper-tolerance
capability. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We first apply the the Central Limit Theorem to develop
the closed form models for both SOP and TOP of a
source-destination transmission.
• Based on the SOP and TOP models and also the Stochas-
tic Ordering Theory, we then conduct analysis to reveal
the monotonicity properties of SOP and TOP. With the
help of such properties, the model for eavesdropper-
tolerance capability is derived.
• A simulator is developed to validate the efficiency of
our theoretical framework and numerical results are also
provided to illustrate the eavesdropper-tolerance capabil-
ity of the concerned network from adopting cooperative
jamming and opportunistic relaying.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model and problem formulation.
In Section III, we conduct the closed form modeling of
SOP and TOP of the end-to-end transmission. The model
for eavesdropper-tolerance capability analysis is developed in
Section IV. Section V presents the simulation and numerical
results to validate our theoretical model and Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model and Assumptions
As depicted in Fig.1, we consider a two-hop wireless
network scenario consisting of a source node S, a destination
node D, n legitimate half-duplex relays R1, R2, · · · , Rn that
cannot transmit and receive at the same time and m passive
and independently-operating eavesdroppers E1, E2, · · · , Em.
We assume that the direct link between S and D does not exist
due to the deep fading and thus S needs to transmit messages
to D via one of the relays. Each of the eavesdroppers attempts
to intercept the messages on its own. Meanwhile, some of the
remaining n − 1 relays will be selected to generate artificial
noise to suppress the eavesdroppers during the transmission.
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Fig. 1. System scenario: Source S is transmitting message to the destination
D with the help of relays R1, R2, · · · , Rn (n = 6 in this figure) while
eavesdroppers E1, E2, · · · , Em (m = 5 in this figure) are attempting to
intercept the message. In this figure, R4 is the message relay and R2, R5
are noise-generating relays.
We aim to ensure both the secure and reliable transmission
from S to D against these eavesdroppers of unknown channel
and location information.
A slow and flat block Rayleigh Fading environment is as-
sumed, where the channel remains static for one coherence in-
terval and varies randomly and independently from interval to
interval. Thus, the channel from a transmitter A to a receiver B
can be represented by a complex zero-mean Gaussian random
variable hA,B and the corresponding channel gain |hA,B|2 is
an exponential random variable. Without loss of generality, we
assume that |hA,B|2 = |hB,A|2 and E
[|hA,B|2] = 1, where
E
[ · ] stands for the expectation operator. It is assumed that
the source S and the relays transmit with the same power
Pt. In addition, we assume the network is interference-limited
and thus the noise at each receiver is negligible. Therefore,
when A is transmitting and relays with indices in R are
generating noise, the received signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)
at a receiver B can be formulated as
SIRA,B =
Pt · |hA,B|2∑
j∈R Pt · |hRj ,B|2
=
|hA,B|2∑
j∈R |hRj ,B|2
.
For the eavesdroppers and legitimate receivers, we use posi-
tive γe and γ respectively to denote the minimum SIR required
to recover the received message. That is, a legitimate receiver
(eavesdropper) is able to decode the transmitted message if
and only if its received SIR exceeds γ (γe). This SIR threshold
scheme can be easily mapped to the Wyner’s encoding scheme
where the transmitter chooses two rates, the rate of transmitted
codewords Rt and the rate of the confidential message Rs
[8], [17]. The rate difference Re = Rt − Rs reflects the
cost of securing the message against the eavesdroppers. The
conversions between the thresholds and the code rates are as
follows:
γ = 2Rt − 1,
γe = 2
Re − 1.
Therefore, the results in this paper also applies to the Wyner’s
encoding scheme.
In order to improve the link condition from S to D, an
opportunistic relaying scheme is adopted, where the best relay
Rb is selected by a timer-based method explained in [32] to
forward messages. Here, b is given by
b
∆
= argmax
j
min{|hS,Rj |2, |hRj ,D|2}.
The transmission then can be conducted in two phases. In
the first phase, S transmits the message to Rb. At the same
time, relays with indices in R1 =
{
j
∣∣j 6= b, |hRj,Rb |2 <
τ
}
, where τ is the noise-generating threshold to control the
interference at legitimate receivers, generate artificial noise to
suppress the eavesdroppers. Analogous to the first phase, Rb
forwards its received message to D with relays whose indices
are in R2 =
{
j
∣∣j 6= b, |hRj ,D|2 < τ} generating noise to
assist the transmission in the second phase.
B. Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we first introduce the concepts of TOP
and SOP of the concerned network, based on which we then
formulate our problem regarding the eavesdropper-tolerance
capability in this paper.
To fully characterize the security and reliability perfor-
mances of the transmission, we adopt the same outage defini-
tions in [17]. Consider the direct link from a transmitter A to a
legitimate receiver B. We say transmission outage happens if
B cannot decode the message (i.e., SIRA,B < γ) and secrecy
outage happens if at least one of the eavesdroppers (say Ei)
can decode the message (i.e., SIRA,Ei ≥ γe). It is shown in
[36] that securing each of the individual links is sufficient to
secure the end-to-end path. Thus, the secrecy (transmission)
outage of the S → Rb → D link occurs if either S → Rb or
Rb → D suffers from secrecy (transmission) outage. Then we
can introduce the following definitions:
• TOP for opportunistic relaying P tobst: This probability is
defined as the probability that the transmission outage of
the S → Rb → D link happens under the opportunistic
relaying scheme.
• SOP for opportunistic relaying P sobst: This probability
is defined as the probability that the secrecy outage of
the S → Rb → D link happens under the opportunistic
relaying scheme.
Based on the above definitions, P tobst and P sobst can be
formulated as
P tobst = P (SIRS,Rb < γ ∪ SIRRb,D < γ) (1)
= 1− P (SIRS,Rb ≥ γ, SIRRb,D ≥ γ)
= 1− P
(
|hS,Rb |2∑
j∈R1
|hRj ,Rb |2
≥ γ, |hRb,D|
2∑
j∈R2
|hRj ,D|2
≥ γ
)
4and
P sobst = P
(
m⋃
i=1
{SIRS,Ei ≥ γe} ∪
m⋃
i=1
{SIRRb,Ei ≥ γe}
)
(2)
= 1− P
(
m⋂
i=1
{SIRS,Ei < γe} ,
m⋂
i=1
{SIRRb,Ei < γe}
)
(a)
= 1−
[
P
( m⋂
i=1
{SIRS,Ei < γe}
)]2
= 1−
[
P
( m⋂
i=1
{ |hS,Ei|2∑
j∈R1
|hRj ,Ei |2
< γe
})]2
where P(·) stands for the probability operator and (a) follows
since the received power of each eavesdropper in two phases
are independent and identically distributed. It is notable that
the second P(·) term in (1) cannot be formulated as
P (SIRS,Rb ≥ γ)P (SIRRb,D ≥ γ) ,
since SIRS,Rb and SIRRb,D are dependent, as will be ob-
served in Appendix A.
Since security and reliability are two important metrics in
network design, we use the SOP constraint εs and TOP con-
straint εt to represent the security and reliability requirements
of the end-to-end transmission. We say that the transmission
from S to D is secure if and only if P sobst ≤ εs and it is
reliable if and only if P tobst ≤ εt. Notice that larger εs and εt
represent less stringent security and reliability requirements. In
this paper, we aim to determine the exact P tobst and P sobst, which
can be then used to determine the exact eavesdropper-tolerance
capability while ensuring both the reliable and secure end-to-
end transmission. We use m∗bst to represent the eavesdropper-
tolerance capability for the opportunistic relaying scheme
hereafter.
Based on the above observations, we are now ready to
formulate our problem. From the definition of P tobst and P sobst,
we can see that when given the number of system relays
n, the SIR thresholds γ, γe, the security requirement εs and
reliability requirement εt, m∗bst only depends on the noise-
generating threshold τ . Thus, we define the maximum number
of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated for a specified τ by
Mbst(τ) = max{m : P sobst(n,m, τ) ≤ εs}.
Now the considered problem can be formulated as
maximize
τ
Mbst(τ)
subject to P tobst(n, τ) ≤ εt, τ ≥ 0
εt ∈ [0, 1], εs ∈ [0, 1]
(3)
where P tobst and P sobst are regarded as functions. That is, we
want to maximize Mbst(τ) over τ . We use τbbst to represent the
optimal τ that maximizes Mbst(τ) for opportunistic relaying
scheme and thus we have m∗bst = Mbst(τbbst).
In order to explore the efficiency of the opportunistic
relaying scheme, we also give the eavesdropper-tolerance
capability of the same network scenario but with a random
relay selection scheme as a comparison, which is considered in
[35]. Similarly, for random relay selection scheme, we define
the TOP by P toran, the SOP by P soran, the optimal τ by τbran
and the eavesdropper-tolerance capability by m∗ran.
III. OUTAGE PERFORMANCES
In this section we determine the TOP P tobst and SOP P sobst
of the network with opportunistic relaying scheme based on
some theoretical analysis. Applying the same approach, we
also give the outage probabilities of the network with random
relay selection scheme.
A. SOP and TOP For Opportunistic Relaying
Before determining the TOP of a network with opportunistic
relaying, we first define the total interference at the legitimate
receiver in two phases by
I1 =
∑
j∈R1
|hRj,Rb |2, I2 =
∑
j∈R2
|hRj ,D|2.
Then, we establish the following lemmas regarding the prob-
ability distribution of I1, I2 and an important joint probability
of the channel gains in two phases, which is critical in
determining P tobst.
Lemma 1: For one message transmission from S to D, the
total interference I1 and I2 are independent and identically
distributed, and can be approximated by a normal random
variable. Thus, the corresponding pdf is given by
f(x) ≈ fˆ(x) = e
(x−µ)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
,
where
µ = (n− 1)
[
1− (1 + τ)e−τ
]
is the mean and
σ =
√
(n− 1)
[
1− τ2e−τ − (1 + τ)2e−2τ
]
is the standard derivation of the normal random variable.
Lemma 2: For one message transmission from S to D, the
joint probability that |hS,Rb |2 is greater than some constant
x ≥ 0 and |hRb,D|2 is greater than some constant y ≥ 0 can
be determined as
P
(
|hS,Rb |2 ≥ x, |hRb,D|2 ≥ y
)
= 1− (1− e−2max{x,y})n
+ne−max{x,y}
[
ϕ(n,min{x, y})− ϕ(n,max{x, y})
]
,
where
ϕ(n, x) = e−x2F1
(
1
2
, 1− n; 3
2
; e−2x
)
and 2F1 is the Gaussian hypergeometric function.
Remark 1: Since S and relays transmit with the same power,
Pt can be reduced in determining the TOP as shown in (1),
and thus it is not considered in Lemma 1. The proofs of the
above lemmas can be found in Appendix A.
For a two-hop wireless network with opportunistic relaying
scheme, we are now ready to derive its TOP P tobst and SOP
5P sobst of the end-to-end transmission based on Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2.
Theorem 1: Consider the network scenario in Fig.1 with
opportunistic relaying scheme. The TOP P tobst and SOP P sobst
can be given by
P tobst ≈ 2
∫ (n−1)τ
0
g(n, γ, x)fˆ(x)
[
Φ(
x− µ
σ
)− Φ(−µ
σ
)
]
dx
−2
∫ (n−1)τ
0
∫ x
0
ne−γxϕ(n, γy)fˆ(x)fˆ (y)dydx (4)
and
P sobst = 1−
(
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
(−1)k
[
(1 − e−τ )ck + e−τ
]n−1)2
(5)
where
c =
1
1 + γe
, fˆ(x) =
e
(x−µ)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
,
Φ(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e−
t2
2 dt,
µ = (n− 1)
[
1− (1 + τ)e−τ
]
,
σ =
√
(n− 1)
[
1− τ2e−τ − (1 + τ)2e−2τ
]
,
g(n, γ, x) = (1− e−2γx)n + ne−γxϕ(n, γx),
ϕ(n, x) = e−x2F1
(
1
2
, 1− n; 3
2
; e−2x
)
and 2F1 is the Gaussian hypergeometric function.
Proof: 1) We first prove the P tobst in (4). According to the
definition in (1), we have
P tobst = 1− P
(
SIRS,Rb ≥ γ, SIRRb,D ≥ γ
)
= 1− P (|hS,Rb|2 ≥ γI1, |hRb,D|2 ≥ γI2)
Applying the law of total probability, we have
P tobst= 1− EI1,I2
[
P
(|hS,Rb |2 ≥ γI1, |hRb,D|2 ≥ γI2) ] (6)
(b)≈ 1−
∫ (n−1)τ
0
∫ (n−1)τ
0
P
(
|hS,Rb |2 ≥ γx, |hRb,D|2 ≥ γy
)
×fˆ(x)fˆ(y)dydx
(c)
= 2
∫ (n−1)τ
0
∫ x
0
{
(1− e−2γx)n
−ne−γx
[
ϕ(n, γy)− ϕ(n, γx)
]}
fˆ(x)fˆ(y)dydx
= 2
∫ (n−1)τ
0
∫ x
0
g(n, γ, x)fˆ(x)fˆ (y)dydx
−2
∫ (n−1)τ
0
∫ x
0
ne−γxϕ(n, γy)fˆ(x)fˆ(y)dydx
= 2
∫ (n−1)τ
0
g(n, γ, x)fˆ(x)
[
Φ(
x− µ
σ
)− Φ(−µ
σ
)
]
dx
−2
∫ (n−1)τ
0
∫ x
0
ne−γxϕ(n, γy)fˆ(x)fˆ(y)dydx,
where (b) is due to Lemma 1 and (c) follows after applying
Lemma 2.
2) Now we proceed to prove the P sobst in (5). According to
the definition in (2), we first need to derive the probability
P
(⋂m
i=1
{
|hS,Ei |
2
∑
j∈R1
|hRj,Ei |
2 < γe
})
.
Note that the number of noise-generating relays in the first
phase |R1| follows the binomial distribution B(n−1, 1−e−τ).
Now, we define the event that there are l noise-generating
relays in the first phase (i.e., |R1| = l) by Bl and thus we
have
P
( m⋂
i=1
{ |hS,Ei|2∑
j∈R1
|hRj ,Ei |2
< γe
})
(7)
=
n−1∑
l=0
P
( m⋂
i=1
{ |hS,Ei|2∑
j∈R1
|hRj ,Ei|2
< γe
}∣∣∣Bl)P(Bl)
(d)
=
n−1∑
l=0
m∏
i=1
P
( |hS,Ei |2∑
j∈R1
|hRj ,Ei |2
< γe
∣∣∣Bl)P(Bl)
(e)
=
n−1∑
l=0
m∏
i=1
E
[
1− e−γe
∑
j∈R1
|hRj,Ei |
2
]
P(Bl)
(f)
=
n−1∑
l=0
m∏
i=1
(
1−
∏
j∈R1
E
[
e−γe|hRj,Ei |
2
])
P(Bl)
=
n−1∑
l=0
[
1−
(
1
1 + γe
)l]m(
n− 1
l
)
(1− e−τ )l(e−τ )n−1−l
=
n−1∑
l=0
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
(−1)k
(
n− 1
l
)
clk(1− e−τ )l(e−τ )n−1−l
(g)
=
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
(−1)k
[
(1− e−τ )ck + e−τ
]n−1
where (d) follows since all the {SIRS,Ei, i = 1, · · · ,m}
are conditionally independent given event Bl, (e) follows by
6applying the law of total probability and the expectation is
computed with respect to {|hRj,Ei |2, j ∈ R1}, (f) follows
since all the |hRj,Ei |2 are independent and identically dis-
tributed and (g) follows by applying the binomial theorem.
Therefore, (5) follows after substituting (7) into (2).
B. SOP and TOP For Random Relay Selection
Applying the same approach, we now can establish the
following lemma about the TOP and SOP under the random
relay selection scheme.
Lemma 3: Consider the network scenario in Fig.1 with
random relay selection scheme. The TOP P toran and SOP P soran
can be given by
P toran = 1−
(
e−τ +
1− e−(1+γ)τ
1 + γ
)2n−2
(8)
and
P soran = 1−
(
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
(−1)k
[
(1 − e−τ )ck + e−τ
]n−1)2
(9)
where c = 11+γe .
Remark 2: The distributions of I1 and I2 are not used in
determining the P toran in (8), because the channel gains in two
hops are independent. Therefore, we can give an exact TOP.
The detailed proof can be found in [35]. It is also noticed that
the SOP P soran in (9) is identical to P sobst in (5). This is because
that the noise-generating schemes are identical in these two
schemes and the message relay selection has no impact on the
intercepting behavior of the eavesdroppers.
IV. EAVESDROPPER-TOLERANCE CAPABILITY
Eavesdropper-tolerance capability characterizes how many
eavesdroppers that can be tolerated at most by a wireless
network with n relays in order to guarantee the desired security
requirement εs and reliability requirement εt. In this section,
we determine the eavesdropper-tolerance capability for oppor-
tunistic relaying scheme based on the problem formulation in
section II-B. The eavesdropper-tolerance capability for random
relay selection scheme is also provided by applying the same
approach.
A. Eavesdropper-Tolerance Capability for Opportunistic Re-
laying
It can be observed from the transmission scheme in section
II-A and the problem formulation in section II-B that the noise-
generating threshold τ is a critical parameter in determining
the eavesdropper-tolerance capability. Too large τ will do harm
to the end-to-end transmission, while too small τ is not enough
to interfere the eavesdroppers. Therefore, finding a optimal τ
is the key to solving our considered problem. Before solving
the problem, we establish the following lemma based on the
Stochastic Ordering in [37].
Lemma 4: Let X and Y be two N-dimensional random
vectors such that
P(X ∈ U) ≤ P(Y ∈ U) for all upper sets U ∈ RN .
Then X is said to be smaller than Y in the usual stochastic
order (denoted by X ≤st Y). And for all increasing function
φ, we always have E[φ(X)] ≤ E[φ(Y)].
Based on the above lemma, we then establish the following
lemmas in terms of the monotonicity of SOP and TOP with
respect to τ .
Lemma 5: The TOP P tobst for opportunistic relaying scheme
increases as τ increases.
Proof: For any 0 < τ1 < τ2, we use random vector
I1 = (I
1
1 , I
1
2 ) to represent the interferences in two phases
when the noise-generating threshold is τ1 and I2 = (I21 , I22 )
to represent those interferences for τ2. For any upper set
U =
{
(I1, I2)
∣∣I1 ≥ x ≥ 0, I2 ≥ y ≥ 0}, we always have
P(I1 ∈ U) = P(I11 ≥ x)P(I12 ≥ y)
and
P(I2 ∈ U) = P(I21 ≥ x)P(I22 ≥ y).
It is easy to see that P(I11 ≥ x) < P(I21 ≥ x) and P(I12 ≥
y) < P(I22 ≥ y), since more interference can be generated
as τ increases. Therefore, we have P(I1 ∈ U) < P(I2 ∈
U) and then I1 ≤st I2 according to Lemma 4. Define the
term P
(|hS,Rb |2 ≥ γI1, |hRb,D|2 ≥ γI2) in (6) by Γ(I) which
decreases as I increases, where I = (I1, I2). Thus, we have
E[Γ(I1)] > E[Γ(I2)] according to Lemma 4. That is, for any
0 < τ1 < τ2, we always have P tobst(τ1) < P tobst(τ2), which
indicates the TOP P tobst increases with τ .
Lemma 6: The SOP P sobst for opportunistic relaying scheme
decreases as τ increases, whereas increases as m increases.
Proof: Notice that the step following (f) in (7) can also
be written as
E
[
1−
(
1
1 + γe
)|R1|]
,
where the expectation is computed with respect to |R1|. For
any 0 ≤ τ1 < τ2, we use two random variables |R11| and |R21|
to represent the number of noise-generating relays in the first
phase, where
|R11| ∼ B(n− 1, 1− e−τ1)
and
|R21| ∼ B(n− 1, 1− e−τ2).
It is shown in [38] that |R11| ≤st |R21|. Applying Lemma 4
again, we can see that
E
[
1−
(
1
1 + γe
)|R11|]
< E
[
1−
(
1
1 + γe
)|R21|]
Therefore, the SOP P sobst decreases as τ increases.
Next, we consider the step following (f) in (7) again. It is
easy to see that the term
1− ( 1
1 + γe
)l ∈ [0, 1).
Thus, the term
[
1−
(
1
1+γe
)l]m
decreases with m. Therefore,
the SOP P sobst increases as m increases.
7Define step (g) in (7) by a function G(m,n, τ). Then
we can derive the eavesdropper-tolerance capability m∗bst for
opportunistic relaying scheme based on Lemma 5 and Lemma
6.
Theorem 2: Consider the network scenario in Fig.1 with
opportunistic relaying scheme. The eavesdropper-tolerance
capability under the security constraint εs and reliability
constraint εt is
m∗bst = max{m : G(m,n, τbbst) ≥
√
1− εs}, (10)
where
G(m,n, τbbst) =
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
(−1)k
[
(1− e−τbbst)ck + e−τbbst
]n−1
,
c = 11+γe and τ
b
bst is the solution of P tobst = εt.
Proof: As shown in (3), we need to find the optimal τ
that maximizes Mbst(τ), where
Mbst(τ) = max{m : G(m,n, τ) ≥
√
1− εs},
according to its definition. Since the TOP P tobst increases with
τ according to Lemma 5, in order to guarantee the reliability
(i.e., P tobst ≤ εt), τ must take values in the region [0, τm],
where τm is the solution of P tobst = εt.
Next, we need to prove that τm is the optimal τ (i.e.,τbbst =
τm). That is, for any τ ∈ [0, τm) we always have Mbst(τ) ≤
Mbst(τm). Now we prove it by contradiction. Suppose there
exists a τ ′ ∈ [0, τm) such that Mbst(τ ′) ≥ Mbst(τm) + 1. It
is easy to see that
G(Mbst(τm) + 1, n, τm) <
√
1− εs,
since Mbst(τm) is the largest m satisfying G(m,n, τm) ≥√
1− εs. By Lemma 6, it can be observed that G(m,n, τ)
increases with τ , whereas decreases with m. Thus, we have
G(Mbst(τm) + 1, n, τ
′) < G(Mbst(τm) + 1, n, τm) <
√
1− εs
and
G(Mbst(τm) + 1, n, τ
′) ≥ G(Mbst(τ ′), n, τ ′) ≥
√
1− εs.
We can see that the above two inequalities are contradictory.
Thus, for any τ ∈ [0, τm) we always have Mbst(τ) ≤
Mbst(τm) (i.e., τbbst = τm) and thus the eavesdropper-tolerance
capability is m∗bst = Mbst(τbbst).
B. Eavesdropper-Tolerance Capability for Random Relay Se-
lection
Applying the same approach, we can establish the following
lemma regarding the eavesdropper-tolerance capability for
random relay selection.
Lemma 7: Consider the network scenario in Fig.1 with
random relay selection scheme. The eavesdropper-tolerance
capability under the security constraint εs and reliability
constraint εt is
m∗ran = max{m : G(m,n, τbran) ≥
√
1− εs}, (11)
where
G(m,n, τbran) =
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
(−1)k
[
(1− e−τbran)ck + e−τbran
]n−1
,
c = 11+γe and τ
b
ran is the solution of
e−τ +
1− e−(1+γ)τ
1 + γ
= (1 − εt) 12n−2 .
Remark 3: Although the exact expressions for m∗bst and
m∗ran are not available, it is easy to calculate them numerically
due to the monotonicity of G(m,n, τ) with respect to m,
after calculating the corresponding optimal noise-generating
threshold τ for these two relay selection schemes.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we first verify our theoretical model for
TOP and SOP through extensive simulations. We then explore
how the number of relays n, the SIR thresholds γ, γe, the
security constraint εs and the reliability constraint εt affect the
eavesdropper-tolerance capability for opportunistic relaying
scheme. Besides, we illustrate the inherent tradeoffs between
the eavesdropper-tolerance capability and security/reliability
constraint. Finally, we compare the opportunistic relaying
scheme with the random relay selection scheme with respect
to the eavesdropper-tolerance capability.
A. Model Validation
A simulator was developed in C++ to simulate the message
transmission from the source S to the destination D based
on the transmission scheme in section II-A, which is now
available at [39]. The SIR threshold for legitimate receivers is
fixed as γ = 10 and that for eavesdroppers is fixed as γe = 0.5.
The total number of end-to-end transmissions is fixed as
100000. The channel varies randomly and independently from
one transmission to another. The simulated TOP (SOP) is
calculated as the ratio of the number of transmissions suffering
from transmission outage (secrecy outage) to the total number
100000. Notice that the simulations with other settings can be
easily performed by our simulator as well.
Extensive simulations have been conducted to verify our
TOP and SOP models. For the TOP, we considered three
different network scenarios of τ = 0.05, 0.075 and 0.1,
which correspond to low interference, moderate interference
and high interference compared to the considered network
size. For the SOP, we also considered three different network
scenarios of (m = 100, τ = 0.05), (m = 100, τ = 0.1)
and (m = 500, τ = 0.05), which correspond to sparse eaves-
droppers with low interference, sparse eavesdroppers with high
interference, and dense eavesdroppers with low interference.
The corresponding simulated results and theoretical results are
summarized in Fig. 2 and Fig.3.
Fig.2 and Fig.3 indicate clearly that the simulated results
match nicely with the theoretical ones for both TOP and SOP,
so our theoretical model can be used to efficiently explore
the eavesdropper-tolerance capability. A further careful ob-
servation of Fig.2 shows that there is still a very small gap
between the simulated results and the theoretical results when
the number of relays n is very small. For example, for the
case that τ = 0.075, the simulated value for P tobst is 0.10314
while the theoretical value is 0.07329 for n = 30, compared
to the simulated value of 0.46626 and theoretical value of
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0.46645 for n = 80. This is because that the Central Limit
Theorem used in deriving our theoretical result fails to model
the pdf of the total interference I1 and I2 very well for small
values of n. We can see from Fig.2 that P tobst increases with
n. This suggests that although the best relay selection scheme
can benefit the transmission as n increases, the interferences
from the noise-generating relays dominate the tendency of the
received SIR at legitimate receivers. By comparing these three
curves in Fig.2, it can also be observed that P tobst increases
as τ increases, which agrees with Lemma 5. This is due to
the reason that more interferences will be generated at the
intended receiver for lager τ , and thus it is more difficult for
the receivers to successfully recover the messages.
We can see from Fig.3 that P sobst decreases as n increases.
This is because more interferences can be generated at the
eavesdroppers by distributing more relays for a specific τ .
By comparing these three curves in Fig.3, it can also be
observed that P sobst increases as m increases while decreases
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as τ increases, which agree with Lemma 6. This is intuitive
since distributing more eavesdroppers by the adversary would
post more potential threats to the end-to-end transmission
and increasing τ would generate more interferences at the
eavesdroppers, so it is more difficult for them to successfully
decode the messages.
B. Eavesdropper-tolerance Performances
Based on the SOP and TOP models, we now explore the
performance of eavesdropper-tolerance capability for oppor-
tunistic relaying scheme. To illustrate the impact of security
and reliability constraints on the eavesdropper-tolerance capa-
bility, we show in Fig.4 the behavior of m∗bst vs. εt and εs for
the network scenario of n = 2000, γ = 10, γe = 0.5, which
implies that the eavesdroppers have a much better decoding
ability than the legitimate receivers. We can observe from Fig.4
that m∗bst increases as εt and εs increase. This reflects that the
network can tolerate more eavesdroppers by relaxing either
the security or reliability requirement. A careful observation
of Fig.4 indicates that εt increases as εs decreases in order to
guarantee a certain level of eavesdropper-tolerance capability.
For example, εt has to increase from 0.04 to 0.085 as εs
decreases from 0.03 to 0.02 for achieving an eavesdropper-
tolerance capacity of about 1000. This suggests that either
the security or reliability requirement has to sacrifice for
the other one in order to achieve a certain eavesdropper-
tolerance capability. From the above discussions, we can see
that there exists clear tradeoffs between the eavesdropper-
tolerance capability and the reliability/security constraint.
To explore how the number of relays affects the
eavesdropper-tolerance capability, we illustrate m∗bst vs. n in
Fig.5 with εt = 0.01 and εs = 0.01 for different settings of γ
and γe. It can be observed from Fig.5 that m∗bst increases
as n increases. This is because that although the optimal
threshold τbbst decreases as n increase for a specific reliability
90 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
E
av
es
dr
op
pe
r-
to
le
ra
nc
e 
ca
pa
bi
lit
y,
  m
  * bs
t
Number of relays,  n
 = 10,
e
 = 0.5
 = 11,
e
 = 0.5
 = 11,
e
 = 0.6
t
 = 0.01,  
s
 = 0.01
Fig. 5. Eavesdropper-tolerance capability m∗
bst
for opportunistic relaying
vs. number of relays n with εt = 0.01, and εs = 0.01.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
0
40
80
120
160
200
E
av
es
dr
op
pe
r-
to
le
ra
nc
e 
ca
pa
bi
lit
y,
  m
   
*
ra
n
Number of relays,  n
  = 0.6,
e
 = 0.5
  = 0.7,
e
 = 0.5
  = 0.7,
e
 = 0.6
t
 = 0.1,
s
 = 0.1
Fig. 6. Eavesdropper-tolerance capability m∗ran for random relay selection
vs. number of relays n with εt = 0.1, and εs = 0.1.
constraint εt, the corresponding expected number of noise-
generating nodes increases, so more interferences can be
generated to suppress the eavesdroppers while the desired
reliability can still be ensured. By comparing the three curves,
we can also observe that m∗bst increases as γe increases, while
decreases as γ increases. This is intuitive since decreasing
the decoding ability (i.e.,increasing γe) of the eavesdroppers
would decrease the SOP, while decreasing the decoding ability
(i.e.,increasing γ) of legitimate receivers would increase the
TOP. It is interesting to notice that m∗bst increases dramatically
when n is above some threshold in Fig.5. For example, for
the case that γ = 11 and γe = 0.6 this threshold is about
2500. Thus, distributing more relays would be an efficient
approach to enhance the eavesdropper-tolerance capability in
the construction of a network.
In order to explore the efficiency of the opportunistic
relaying scheme, we also illustrate the eavesdropper-tolerance
capability m∗ran of random relay selection scheme vs. the
number of relays n in Fig.6 with εt = 0.1 and εs = 0.1
for different setting of γ and γe. Notice that the security and
reliability requirements here are much more relaxed and the
decoding ability of the legitimate receivers are much more
improved than those for opportunistic relaying in Fig.5. For
example, γ = 0.6 is much smaller compared to γ = 10 in
Fig.5. That means we consider a much more conservative
scenario for random relay selection scheme and the network
can hardly tolerate any eavesdropper if we consider the same
scenario as that in Fig.5. It can be observed from Fig.6 that
m∗ran also increases as γe increases, while decreases as γ
increases due to the same reason presented in the discussion
of Fig.5. Even for such a conservative scenario, we still can
observe from Fig.6 and Fig.5 that the eavesdropper tolerance
capability of random relay selection is orders of magnitude
less than that of opportunistic relaying scheme, especially for
large values of n. For example, for the case that γ = 0.7
and γe = 0.6 in Fig.6 the network can tolerate about 207
eavesdroppers, which is much less than 8959 eavesdroppers
for the case that γ = 11 and γe = 0.6 in Fig.5 when n = 3000.
As the eavesdropper-tolerance capability for random relay
selection scheme decreases with γ, it will decreases to 0 if
we increases γ to 11. This implies that the opportunistic re-
laying scheme can achieve a significantly better eavesdropper-
tolerance capability than random relay selection.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper established a theoretical framework to analyze
the eavesdropper-tolerance capability of a two-hop wireless
network, where cooperative jamming and opportunistic re-
laying techniques are adopted to provide secure and reliable
end-to-end transmission against passive and independently-
operating eavesdroppers of unknown location and channel
information. We first apply the Central Limit Theorem to
model the TOP and SOP in closed form, based on which and
also the Stochastic Ordering we then develop the model for
eavesdropper-tolerance capability analysis. Our results indicate
that in general more eavesdroppers can be tolerated in the
concerned network if a less stringent requirement on both met-
rics security and reliability is allowed, but a tradeoff between
the requirements on these two metrics does exist to ensure a
certain level of eavesdropper-tolerance capability. The results
in this paper also reveal that the opportunistic relaying scheme
significantly outperforms the random relay selection scheme in
terms of the eavesdropper-tolerance capability, and the scheme
can guarantee an acceptable eavesdropper-tolerance capability
even when a stringent requirement on security and reliability
is imposed.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1 AND 2
Proof of Lemma 1: From the transmission protocol and the
i.i.d fading assumption, we can easily see that I1 and I2 are
the sum of random variables which are smaller than τ among
n−1 i.i.d random variables and thus I1 and I2 are independent
and identically distributed.
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Now we take I1 for example to determine the distribution of
the total interference in both hops. Fist, we define a function
U(x) = 1x<τ(x) · x,
where
1x<τ (x) =
{
1, x < τ
0, otherwise
is an indicator function and then I1 can be formulated as
I1 =
n∑
j=1,j 6=b
U(|hRj ,Rb |2),
which is the sum of n − 1 i.i.d random variables with pdf
given by the following mixed density and mass function
fU (u) =
{
e−τδ(u) + e−u, 0 ≤ u ≤ τ
0, otherwise,
where δ(x) is the Dirac delta function. The mean and variance
of the mixed-type random variable U(|hRj ,Rb |2) can be given
by
µ1 = 1− (1 + τ)e−τ
and
σ21 = 1− τ2e−τ − (1 + τ)2e−2τ .
Therefore, the pdf of I1 can be recursively given by the
following mixed density and mass function
f(x) =
{
e−(n−1)τδ(x) + pn−1(x)e
−x, 0 ≤ x ≤ (n− 1)τ
0, otherwise
,
where pn−1(x) is a piecewise function and coincides with
different polynomial functions of degree at most n−2 on each
interval (kτ, (k+1)τ ] for 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 2. However, it is quite
difficult to determine the function pn−1(x), especially for large
n. Thus, we approximate it by a normal random variable with
mean µ = (n− 1)µ1 and variance σ2 = (n− 1)σ21 , according
to the Central Limit Theorem and its pdf can be approximated
by
f(x) ≈ fˆ(x) = e
(x−µ)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
where
µ = (n− 1)
[
1− (1 + τ)e−τ
]
and
σ =
√
(n− 1)
[
1− τ2e−τ − (1 + τ)2e−2τ
]
.
Proof of Lemma 2: Before deriving the probability in
Lemma 2, we first define the event that relay Rk, k =
1, · · · , n is selected as the message relay by Ak (i.e., b =
k). Besides, we use a new random variable Sj to define
min{|hS,Rj |2, |hRj ,D|2} for each relay Rj . It is notable that
Sj , j = 1, · · · , n is an exponential random variable with mean
1
2 . Then, we have
Ak
∆
=
n⋂
j=1,j 6=k
(Sj ≤ Sk) .
Now, applying the law of total probability, we have
P
(
|hS,Rb|2 ≥ x, |hRb,D|2 ≥ y
)
(12)
=
n∑
k=1
P
(|hS,Rk |2 ≥ x, |hRk,D|2 ≥ y,Ak)
=
n∑
k=1
P
(
|hS,Rk |2 ≥ x, |hRk,D|2 ≥ y,
n⋂
j=1,j 6=k
(Sj ≤ Sk)
)
(h)
=
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
P
(
|hS,Rk |2 ≥ x, |hRk,D|2 ≥ y,
Sk = s,
n⋂
j=1,j 6=k
(Sj ≤ s)
)
ds
=
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
P
(
|hS,Rk |2 ≥ x, |hRk,D|2 ≥ y, Sk = s
)
×P
(
n⋂
j=1,j 6=k
(Sj ≤ s)
)
ds
=
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
P
(
|hS,Rk |2 ≥ x, |hRk,D|2 ≥ y, Sk = s
)
×(1− e−2s)n−1ds,
where (h) integrates over all the values Sk can take.
When x ≥ y ≥ 0, (12) can be reduced to
P
(
|hS,Rb |2 ≥ x, |hRb,D|2 ≥ y
)
(13)
=
n∑
k=1
{∫ ∞
x
P
(
|hS,Rk |2 = s, |hRk,D|2 ≥ s
)
(1− e−2s)n−1ds
+
∫ x
y
P
(
|hS,Rk |2 > x, |hRk,D|2 = s
)
(1 − e−2s)n−1ds
+
∫ ∞
x
P
(
|hS,Rk |2 > s, |hRk,D|2 = s
)
(1 − e−2s)n−1ds
}
= 2n
∫ ∞
x
(1− e−2s)n−1
e2s
ds+ ne−x
∫ x
y
(1− e−2s)n−1
es
ds
= 1− (1 − e−2x)n−1 + ne−x
∫ e−y
e−x
(1− t2)n−1dt
= 1− (1 − e−2x)n−1 + ne−x
[
ϕ(n, y)− ϕ(n, x)
]
,
where
ϕ(n, x) = e−x2F1
(
1
2
, 1− n; 3
2
; e−2x
)
and 2F1 is the Gaussian hypergeometric function.
Similarly, when 0 ≤ x < y, (12) can be reduced to
P
(
|hS,Rb|2 ≥ x, |hRb,D|2 ≥ y
)
(14)
= 1− (1− e−2y)n−1 + ne−y
[
ϕ(n, x) − ϕ(n, y)
]
Combining (13) and (14), Lemma 2 then follows.
11
REFERENCES
[1] S. Narayanan and P. University, Two-hop Forwarding in Wireless Net-
works. Polytechnic University, 2006.
[2] W. Stallings, Creptography and network security: principles and prac-
tice, 5th ed. Prentice Hall, January 2010.
[3] Y. Xie, S. Tang, Y. Xiang, and J. Hu, “Resisting web proxy-based
http attacks by temporal and spatial locality behavior,” Parallel and
Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 24, no. 7, pp. 1401–
1410, 2013.
[4] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, 1976.
[5] P. Shor, “Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and
factoring,” in Foundations of Computer Science, 1994 Proceedings., 35th
Annual Symposium on, 1994, pp. 124–134.
[6] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless
information-theoretic security,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2515–2534, 2008.
[7] A. Mukherjee, S. A. A. Fakoorian, J. Huang, and A. L. Swindlehurst,
“Principles of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks:
A survey,” CoRR, vol. abs/1011.3754, 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3754
[8] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal,
vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[9] I. Csisza´r and J. Korner, “Broadcast channels with confidential mes-
sages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, 1978.
[10] S. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The gaussian wire-tap chan-
nel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451–456, 1978.
[11] U. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common
information,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 39, no. 3,
pp. 733–742, 1993.
[12] A. Hero, “Secure space-time communication,” Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 49, no. 12, pp. 3235–3249, 2003.
[13] R. Negi and S. Goel, “Secret communication using artificial noise,” in
IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, 2005, pp. 1906–1910.
[14] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Secret communication in presence of colluding
eavesdroppers,” in IEEE Military Communications Conference, 2005,
pp. 1501–1506.
[15] J. Barros and M. R. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless channels,”
in IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 2006, pp. 356–
360.
[16] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The general gaussian multiple-access and two-
way wiretap channels: Achievable rates and cooperative jamming,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2735–2751,
2008.
[17] X. Zhou, R. Ganti, J. Andrews, and A. Hjørungnes, “On the throughput
cost of physical layer security in decentralized wireless networks,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun, vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 2764–2775, 2011.
[18] C. Capar, D. Goeckel, B. Liu, and D. Towsley, “Secret communication
in large wireless networks without eavesdropper location information,”
in INFOCOM, 2012 Proceedings IEEE, 2012, pp. 1152–1160.
[19] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process, vol. 58, pp. 1875–1888, 2010.
[20] J. Li, A. Petropulu, and S. Weber, “On cooperative relaying schemes for
wireless physical layer security,” Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 4985–4997, 2011.
[21] B. Han and J. Li, “Secrecy capacity maximization for secure cooperative
ad-hoc networks,” in INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE, 2013, pp.
2796–2804.
[22] J. Vilela, M. Bloch, J. Barros, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless secrecy
regions with friendly jamming,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 256–266, 2011.
[23] J. Vilela, P. Pinto, and J. Barros, “Position-based jamming for enhanced
wireless secrecy,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transac-
tions on, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 616–627, 2011.
[24] J. Huang and A. Swindlehurst, “Cooperative jamming for secure com-
munications in mimo relay networks,” IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 4871–4884, 2011.
[25] I. Krikidis, J. Thompson, and S. Mclaughlin, “Relay selection for secure
cooperative networks with jamming,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun,
vol. 8, no. 10, pp. 5003–5011, 2009.
[26] Z. Ding, K. Leung, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, “Opportunistic relaying
for secrecy communications: Cooperative jamming vs. relay chatting,”
Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 10, no. 6, pp.
1725–1729, 2011.
[27] R. Bassily and S. Ulukus, “Deaf cooperation and relay selection
strategies for secure communication in multiple relay networks,” Signal
Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 61, no. 6, pp. 1544–1554, 2013.
[28] S. Vasudevan, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, “Security-capacity trade-off
in large wireless networks using keyless secrecy,” in ACM international
symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing, 2010, pp. 21–
30.
[29] M. Haenggi, “The secrecy graph and some of its properties,” in IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory, 2008, pp. 539–543.
[30] Y. Liang, H. Poor, and L. Ying, “Secrecy throughput of manets under
passive and active attacks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 10, pp.
6692–6702, 2011.
[31] D. Goeckel, S. Vasudevan, D. Towsley, S. Adams, Z. Ding, and K. Le-
ung, “Artificial noise generation from cooperative relays for everlasting
secrecy in two-hop wireless networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.,
vol. 29, pp. 2067–2076, 2011.
[32] A. Bletsas, S. Khisti, D. Reed, and A. Lippman, “A simple cooperative
diversity method based on network path selection,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun., vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 659–672, Mar. 2006.
[33] A. Sheikholeslami, D. Goeckel, H. Pishro-Nik, and D. Towsley, “Phys-
ical layer security from inter-session interference in large wireless
networks,” in Proceeding of IEEE INFOCOM 2012, 2012, pp. 1179–
1187.
[34] Y. Shen, X. Jiang, and J. Ma, “Flexible relay selection for secure com-
munication in two-hop wireless networks,” in Modeling Optimization
in Mobile, Ad Hoc Wireless Networks (WiOpt), 2013 11th International
Symposium on, 2013, pp. 648–651.
[35] Y. Zhang, Y. Shen, and X. Jiang, “Eavesdropper tolerance capability
study in two-hop cooperative wireless networks,” in 2013 2nd IEEE/CIC
International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC): QRS:
QoS, Reliability and Security, 2013, pp. 219–223.
[36] O. Koyluoglu, C. Koksal, and H. El Mamal, “On secrecy capacity scaling
in wireless networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 3000–
3015, 2012.
[37] M. Shaked and J. Shanthikumar, Stochastic orders, 1st ed., ser. Springer
Series in Statistics. Springer, Nov. 2010.
[38] A. Klenke and L. Mattner, “Stochastic ordering of classical discrete
distributions,” Advances in Applied Probability, vol. 42(2), pp. 393–410,
2010.
[39] C++ simulator for two-hop transmission with cooperative jamming and
opportunistic relaying. [Online]. Available: http://mdlval.blogspot.jp/
